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RAFT based Wireless Blockchain Networks in the
Presence of Malicious Jamming
Hao Xu, Lei Zhang, Senior Member, IEEE, Yinuo Liu, Bin Cao, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Blockchain shows great potential to be applied in
wireless IoT ecosystems for establishing the trust and consensus
mechanisms without central authority’s involvement. Based on
RAFT consensus mechanism, this paper investigates the security
performance of wireless blockchain networks in the presence of
malicious jamming. We first map and model the blockchain
transaction as a wireless network composed of uplink and
downlink transmissions by assuming the follower nodes’ position
as a Poisson Point Process (PPP) with selected leader location.
The probability of achieving successful blockchain transactions is
derived and verified by extensive simulations. The results provide
analytical guidance for the practical deployment of wireless
blockchain networks.
Index Terms—Wireless Blockchain Network, RAFT, Security
Analysis, Private Blockchain, Jamming
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain is a revolutionary record/ledger store system that
offers users a decentralized architecture and strong tamper-
proof ability, thanks to the cryptographic and consensuses
mechanisms advances in past decades. It has been widely
recognized that blockchain has the potential to transform how
we share information and reshapes the future digital economy
and society widely ranging from Internet of Things (IoT),
energy, transportation, finance service, healthcare, etc [1].
The consensus mechanisms are the ground basis of
blockchain for establishing trust and agreement without any
third party involvement. Unlike Proof of Work (PoW) [2] and
Proof of Stacks (PoS) [3] based public chains [4], the private
or consortium blockchain, which has wider applications, uses
other consensus mechanisms rather than PoW (or PoS) to
avoid high costs of computation, low transaction throughput
and long confirmation delay, etc. [1]. Besides, such a net-
work requires a more efficient protocol to allow its existence
among wirelessly connected IoT devices and other thin-clients,
such as mobile phones. Paxos [5], RAFT [6] and Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (BFT) [7] are representative low complexity
protocols may be used in wireless connected low-complex
device developed for the distributed system with unreliable
nodes. The consensus of such a network will be made if
the majority votes successfully through the communications
among the nodes in the consensus networks [8]. In other
words, if too many honest votes fail, due to communication
faults or false information by malicious users, the agreement
on this transaction will not happen. Hence the blockchain
synchronization will fail.
Depends on whether the consensus network has malicious
(or Byzantine) users that may send fake information to others,
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we have BFT [7], which prevents dishonest nodes rigging the
decision, and the Crash Fault Tolerance (CFT) [5] consensus
mechanism, which does not allow the existence of Byzantine
nodes in the network through strict access control but may
have communication links failures. The BFT is not necessary
to the private consensus network due to reinforced identifica-
tion check, whereas, RAFT based CFT is the most demanding
feature for faster and less complicated consensus.
In the permissioned private blockchain, all nodes that have
the right to vote are honest, so the problem of getting accor-
dance with the peer-to-peer network is the crash tolerance.
Therefore the threat will be communication failure among
the nodes. To mediate the complexity of phase states, RAFT
came into public view with its concise definition, compara-
ble performance as Paxos [5][6]. RAFT categorizes nodes
into two term-time roles (term of service), one leader and
many followers. The leader communicates with the followers
through downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) transmissions. When
the majority has voted and been successfully received by
the leader, the transaction is marked as a success, and the
transaction will be inserted into the blockchain. In order to
build a RAFT consensus algorithm among nodes, the leader
is often undertaken by a stronger node with higher capabilities
such as better reliability and performances (i.e., power, battery
life, etc.). The voting, which is the state replication from
leader to followers, matters in the sense that either UL or
DL communications may not be successful [6].
Blockchain deployment in wireless is foreseeable. In terms
of wireless blockchain, take IoT network as an example, where
the network is typically a permissioned and dedicated network,
the quorum permission is top priority comparing with trojan
threats. Therefore, given the fact of wireless massive low
complexity IoT applications are emerging and there is no
research except Sun’s work [9]. Using his theory, it turns out
that RAFT can be a feasible solution under the circumstance
of IoT to blockchain-enabled IoT ecosystems under the as-
sumption of Y.Sun’s assessment of wireless IoT Blockchain
performance. Note that the scheme proposed here is for
private chain and no Byzantine node is allowed. However,
the wireless connection among the leader and the followers
can be vulnerable due to wireless channel fading and un-
permitted malicious jammers. Either UL or DL failure will
cause specific voting failure, thus lower transaction success
rate. In addition, although no Byzantine node is allowed in
private blockchain, malicious users can exist in the network to
prevent the consensus being achieved among the nodes through
spectrum jamming due to the openness of the wireless channel.
Note that the jammers are un-permitted thus do not belongs to
the consensus network and it has no right to vote. Thus, the
success rate of the blockchain transactions in the presence of
radio jamming is a critically important topic to be explored for
the practical network deployment. In [9], the authors first pro-
posed the wireless connected blockchain system and modeled
the relationship of communication throughput and transaction
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throughput, and the optimal Full Node (FN) deployment is
derived. However, to the best authors’ knowledge, there is
no work, which considers the security performance for RAFT
based wireless blockchain networks with malicious jamming.
Unlike the traditional communication problems that typi-
cally focus on the success of individual communication link,
the problem in this study is shifted to multiple communication
links network and the aim is to make sure that at least 51%
of the communications links (for both uplink and downlink)
of them must be successful, with or without the presence of
malicious jamming. To solve this problem, we first map and
model the blockchain transaction processing into the wire-
less DL and UL transmission. Then, the transaction success
probability of wireless RAFT blockchain is investigated. Note
that the jamming attack can come from both high or low
layer. We have used the classic metric SINR as a threshold.
Any nodes received a signal below the threshold will be
considered as a failure. However, it is worth mentioning
that the SINR threshold can be changed to any other com-
munication metrics such as Mean Square Error (MSE) or
even Bit Error Rate (BER), etc. The analytical results show
the relationship of success probability of wireless blockchain
network, the nodes location, and transmitting power. Using the
fundamental modeling and analysis, the study is also beneficial
to cellular, vehicular network or other wireless blockchain-
enabled sensors network[10].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The RAFT-based wireless blockchain network is shown in
Fig. 1, where the network is composed of two parts, clients
and wireless consensus network. Note that, the two parts are
not necessarily separated geographically and Fig. 1 is only an
example to illustrate the roles of nodes and the communication
network topology. In different business models, the IoT node
can choose to be a client or become a voter in the blockchain
network by playing a leader or a follower. In other words, the
roles of the nodes are exchangeable during RAFT consensus
election. In the case of being a client, the node is not a part
of the consensus network but sends out transaction requests
to the leader to agree with the followers. Then it waits for the
confirmation from the blockchain network, where the success
consensus will be inserted into the blockchain. Following the
requirement of RAFT consensus, the nodes who plays the role
of leader and followers are categorized into the FN or voters,
as shown in Fig. 1. In general, the consensus is triggered by
the request from the clients; thus, the communication is one
way. However, the result decided by the consensus network
can be sent backward, which is not the focus of the paper.
In this paper, we will only focus on the communications
inside the consensus network, where we assume all followers
for the consensus networks are evenly distributed in a 2-
Dimensional free space with Poisson Point Process (PPP). The
procedure of wireless RAFT blockchain consensus is stated as
follows. Firstly, the FN (leader) sends out a signal that contains
transaction information from clients, via DL broadcasting
channel to the follower nodes. Upon the successfully received
DL message, the voter (follower) will then confirm its voting
message to the leader via multi-access UL channels. We
assume that there is no multi-access interference among the
followers since in the private blockchain networks, Carrier
Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) or centralized radio resource
allocation is possible. In fact, the IoT transmission interval can
be large enough compared to the radio transmission interval
[9]. Thus, the probability of collision can be negligible. Lastly,
Fig. 1. RAFT-based Wireless Blockchain Network.
the FN will count all receipts, and the overall aim is to achieve
the consensus, i.e., it receives more than 50% of responses
from the followers, and any failure in either DL or UL will
result in losing that follower and lower the success rate.
Suppose the position of the FN is C0 = (x0, y0), which is
assumed at the geo-center of consensus network, we assume
there is one jammer randomly located around (but not neces-
sarily located inside) the consensus network with a position
of (x1, y1). For an arbitrary follower node, we assume the
location is (x, y). Thus, its distance to the FN is denoted
by dF =
√
(x0 − x)2 + (y0 − y)2 and its distance to the
jammer is denoted by dJ =
√
(x1 − x)2 + (y1 − y)2. While
the distance between the jammer and the leader can be written
as dFJ =
√
(x0 − x1)2 + (y0 − y1)2.
The unified signal model for both UL and DL transmission
can be defined as follows:
y = Hs+ I +N, (1)
where H = h(t)/
√
dγ is wireless channel composed of both
large scale path loss PL = d−γ with d and γ being the
distance and path loss exponential factor respectively. h(t) is
the small scale fading factor. Without loss of generality, we
assume h(t) ∼ CN (0, 1). s is the signal contains the infor-
mation of the transaction to be confirmed by the consensus
network, I is the interference by the jammer and N is the
noise with a Gaussian distribution of N ∼ CN (0, σ2).
III. WIRELESS BLOCKCHAIN SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the next, we will focus on the derivations of the trans-
action success rate by modeling the UL and DL wireless
communications in the blockchain consensus networks.
A. Downlink Transmission
To have the DL transmission success at any follower, we
assume the received SINR (signal-to-interference-plus-noise
ratio) is higher than a threshold βD, i.e.,
SINRD = E[
PS |HS(t)|2
dγF
]/E[(
PJ |HJ(t)|2
dγJ
+ |N |2)] ≥ βD,
(2)
where E is the expectation operator, PS = E{|s|2} and
PJ = E{|I|2} are the transmitting power of FN and jammer
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respectively. HS(t) and HJ(t) are channels from leader to a
follower and from the jammer to the follower, respectively.
Using the generic channel equation H = h(t)/
√
dγ and
h(t) ∼ CN (0, 1), (2) is written as:
PS
dγF
≥ βD(PJ
dγJ
+ σ2). (3)
Now let us consider two cases: a noise-limited system
without a jammer and an interference-limited system with
a jammer. In noise limited case, PJ = 0, and substituting
dF =
√
(x0 − x)2 + (y0 − y)2 into equation (3), we have
(x− x0)2 + (y − y0)2 ≤ PSβD , which implies that to make the
SINR higher than βD, follower nodes must be located inside
the circle at the centre (x0, y0) and its radius of
√
PS/βD.
When the jammer is introduced, due to the strong radiation
power of the jammer PJ , we can assume this system is inter-
ference limited and thus the noise can be omitted. Substituting
σ2 = 0 into (3), we can have the following inequality
(x− xD)2 + (y − yD)2 ≥ R2D. (4)
Equation (4) implies that to achieve the SINR threshold, the
follower must be outside the jamming circle with its centre at
CJD = (xD, yD) = (
αDx0 − x1
αD − 1 ,
αDy0 − y1
αD − 1 ), (5)
and radius is
RD = (
√
αD(x0 − x1)2 + αD(y0 − y1)2)/(αD − 1), (6)
where αD = (βDPJ)
2
γ /P
2
γ
S . Equation (4) implies that any
node inside the circle will be jammed and can not receive
the blockchain message from the leader. In the case of the
jammed circle (CJD, RD) is totally inside of the considered
area (C0, R), it is equivalent to use the area of the circle ARD
to represent the the number of failures. Thus, the viable area
for DL transmission is the area of the considered circle (C0, R)
except the circular area (CJD, RD), which is AR − ARD ,
where AR is the area of (C0, R). Thus, the success rate can be
write as (AR−ARD )/AR. However, when part of the jammed
circle (CJD, RD) is outside (C0, R), the variable area can not
be calculated straightforwardly. To calculate the DL success
rate, using some geometry derivations, we can have four cases,
defined by α, the angle between two intersecting points with
respect to CJD, βD and the jammer location regarding the
FN. Denote the distance between CJD and (x0, y0) as dJC .
By denoting D = RD + dJC , for βD ∈ (0,∞), we have the
probability of success for DL transmission derived as:
P ds =
Viable downlink area
Area of given circle AR
=

AR−ARD
AR
D ≤ R, βD 6= 1
1
AR
{AR −ARD D ∈ (R,R+ 2RD)
+SRD −∆RD βD ∈ (0, 1) or
+sign(sinα) D ∈ (R, 2RD −R)
×(SR −∆R)} βD > 1
1
pi arccos
dFJ
2R dFJ ∈ [0, R] and
− dFJ2piR
√
1− d2FJ4R2 βD = 1
0 others,
(7)
where SR and SRD denote the two circular sectors of FN and
DL circle; ∆R and ∆RD denote the triangle of two intersecting
points and the centre of FN or DL circle; sign(x) is a function
giving the sign of x. Note that when βD = 1, the area is
calculated as a circular segment defined using the middle point
between jammer and the FN along with its perpendicular line’s
intersection points. The segment is the jammed area, which
contains the jammer, and its size depends on the jammer
location regards to the FN.
B. Uplink Transmission
In terms of UL, the leader will receive mixed signals
from followers and the jammer. Note, as we justified in
Section II that there is no multi-access interference among
the followers by using CSMA or centralized radio resource
allocation schemes. To detect the UL signal that carries voting
message correctly, we assume that the SINR of the received
signal at the leader satisfies
SINRU = E[
PS |HS(t)|2
dγF
]/E[(
PJ |HJ(t)|2
dγFJ
+ |N |2)] ≥ βU ,
(8)
where βU is UL SINR detection threshold. Similarly, we can
have
dγF ≤
PS
βU (
PJ
dγFJ
+ σ2)
2
γ
. (9)
Therefore, we have the following circular boundary
(CJU , RU ) and its area ARU
(x− x0)2 + (y − y0)2 ≤ R2U , (10)
with its centre at
CJU = (x0, y0), (11)
and radius
RU =
√
(
PS
βU (
PJ
dγFJ
+ σ2)
)
2
γ . (12)
The circle is the bound of success and failure area, where the
inner circle is viable, and the outer area is jammed, which is
opposite of the DL case. Note that the interference and noise
are integrated into the equation (12), and thus, it is compatible
with any configurations. Given the fact that all voting nodes
are evenly distributed in the area, the probability of success
for UL transmission can be derived as:
Pus =
Viable UL area
Area of the given circle
=
{ ARU
AR
RU < R
1 RU ≥ R
(13)
Compared to the DL case, the UL case is straightforward
as shown in equation (13), where given a weak jammer power
plus noise power, the viable area can be larger than the
considered consensus network (i.e., the circle of the radius
R). In this case, all of the followers will have successful UL
transmissions. For optimization, when the RU = R, all nodes
will have valid transactions, hence the optimal PS can be
worked out. Again, by considering the small fading factor, an
instantaneous UL transmission may not meet the derivations
in equations (12) and (13).
Given the equations (5), (11), and the leader’s location C0,
we have the following property.
Remark. The centre points (x0, y0), centre of jamming DL
area (xD, yD) and jammer location(x1, y1) are on a straight
line.
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The proof is straightforward since we have the following
relationship: yc−y0xc−x0 =
y1−y0
x1−x0 . Since both circles’ centers have
the same gradient, hence they are on one straight line.
C. Probability of successful blockchain transaction
In order to have a successful follower vote, both UL and
DL must be successful between the follower and the leader.
Thus, only the followers that meet both equations (4) and
(10) will have a successful vote. According to the consensus
principle of RAFT, only majority nodes (over 50%) success
will have the transaction recorded in the blockchain. To
calculate the probability of a successful transaction recognized
by consensus network in RAFT based blockchain, according
to (7) and (13), it is equivalent to calculate if the successful
area (for both UL and DL) is more than half of the overall
area. By writing as a formula,
P = p(
Viable downlink area
⋂
Viable uplink area
Area of given circle AR
). (14)⋂
takes interaction area of two sets. In the next, we will derive
the analytical expression of (14). It is worth mentioning that
in RAFT protocol, the successful transmission happens when
P > 0.5. It should be noted that the UL viable area can
be overlapped with the DL jammed area. Here to make the
analysis simple, we have assumed that UL and DL SINR
threshold βD = βU = β. Depending on the value of β,
we have the following theorem for different intersections of
circles.
Theorem. For jammer located within the valid distance R
and β ∈ (0,∞), we have the probability P of the successful
transaction for the wireless RAFT blockchain networks as
P =

ARU−ARD
AR
, β ∈ (0, 14 ]
1
AR
{AR −ARU + SRD −∆RD β ∈ ( 14 , 1)
+sign(sinαU )(SRU −∆RU )}
⋃
(1,∞)
ARU
AR
( 23 +
√
3
4pi ) β = 1,
ARU ∈ [0, AR]
0, others
(15)
where SRU denotes the UL circle; ∆RU is the triangle of two
intersecting points and the centre of UL circle; αU denotes the
angle between two intersecting points of the UL circle and DL
circle with respect to the centre of DL circle.
Proof. By considering the cases of β, when β 6= 1, the success
area is ARU ∩ARD . For β = 1, the downlink area is divided
into two circular segments, which are separated by the chord
defined using the middle point between the jammer and FN,
where the near side downlink segment to the jammer is the
failed area ARD , hence the success area is again ARU ∩ARD .
When β is small, taking β = 0.1 as an example, the
maximum DL circle is always inside the UL circle, which
makes the tangency of two circles the maximum jamming area.
Due to the increasing β value, two circles start overlapping
with each other, but the DL circle is always smaller than the
half area of great circle R. The maximum area is reached at
the maximum chord length for the DL circle.
Failed nodeFull node Jammer Success node
Overall AreaUplink Success AreaDownlink Failure Area
SIR = -10 dB SIR = -6 dB
Fig. 2. Uplink and downlink transmission successful areas with two SINR
threshold settings
Given equation (15), one can analytically calculate the
success rate of the blockchain transaction in the wireless
blockchain systems, where we can see that the probability of
success depends on the β, jammer distance dFJ and size of
the circle AR, hence it gives the relation of circle size with the
power of the jammer and follower nodes. Note that the jammer
can be placed in any location, including the region outside the
circle, which naturally results in ineffective jamming. Unless
the voter has a poor SINR value, such as 20dB, the jamming
might be successful from a far distance. Thus, (15) provides an
insightful guide to the indigenous wireless blockchain network
design, parameter selections and optimizations.
It is worth mentioning the communication complexity of
RAFT. Given RAFT consensus network with the number of
n nodes and one of them is the leader. Hence, the vote
message count for uplink and downlink will be n−1 each side.
Therefore, at least 2n − 2 messages will be incurred during
one consensus process. However, in practical deployment, the
message will be attempted multiple times within the timeout
frame, hence in the worst case, upon the retries t times, the
system will confirm its final state. Therefore, the message
quantity f(n) = t(2n− 2).
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In order to validate the proposed wireless blockchain net-
work models and derivations, a set of simulations are con-
ducted. We assume the nodes are evenly distributed in a
circle with radius R = 100 m with a fixed density (in total
1000 nodes, approximately 31847 nodes/km2), the DL and UL
SINR threshold maintains the same. We also assume that all
nodes radiate the same level and omnidirectional signal. The
jammer sends interference signals continuously at both UL
and DL frequency bands.
a) Simulation 1: Uplink and Downlink Success rates:
The successful areas of UL and DL transmissions are shown
in Fig. 2, where the successful nodes are marked in green,
and failed ones are red. In this simulation, we assume γ = 2.5
and the detection SINR thresholds are β = −10 dB (left sub-
figure) and β = −6 dB (right sub-figure), respectively. As to
compare the influence of different SINR values, the location
of the jammer is fixed at 30 m from the FN and maintains the
same transmission power for both UL and DL.
Comparisons on two sub-figures in Fig. 2 gives a straightfor-
ward visual. When the required SINR threshold is high in the
right-hand sub-figure (i.e., β = −6 dB), the consensus cannot
be achieved since the number of failed nodes (in red) is more
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Fig. 3. Transaction success probability P vs. the jammer distance from origin
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than the success ones (in green). However, with an increased
receiver sensitivity (i.e., reduce the SINR threshold to −10
dB in this case), we can obliviously see that the successful
blockchain consensus can be achieved since much more green
nodes than red nodes.
b) Simulation 2: Success rate vs. jammer location: This
simulation shows the combined jamming area for different
jammer location from the center of the FN. We have also
shown the analytical result derived in equation (15) here for
verification. It can be seen that in all cases, the analytical and
simulation results match well in Fig. 3, where β = −10 dB
matches the first part of equation (15), β = −5 dB matches
second part and β = 0 dB matches third part.
Additionally, the plots shift to right while we increase the
SINR threshold at the receiver. It verifies that the jammed
area increases because of the increased SINR at the receiver,
hence high SINR will lead to a higher failure rate. The trend
for all three curves shows that the further jammer away from
the center, the less jammed area it produces. Fig. 3 also
shows the half area line, which indicates the jammer distance
for a successful blockage and curves above the line denotes
successful transaction and vice verse. When SINR = −10 and
−5 dB, there is a plateau on the combined plot because of the
complicated geometry shape of the overlapping circle with
its moving center, and when SINR is small, the jammer is
effective if it is close to the FN.
c) Simulation 3: Performance analysis of different SINRs:
In this simulation, two cases of path loss exponential factors
are considered, i.e., γ = 2.5 and 3.5. Fig. 4 shows the combined
probability of half of the nodes successfully completing both
UL and DL communication with FN. It can be seen that for
both cases, the analytical and simulated results match well,
which verifies the effectiveness of our derivations. The success
rate reduces during the receiver SINR threshold increases
because the sensitivity is not sufficient to distinguish the
jammer among desired signals. Besides, there is a possibility
that the jammer can be very close to the leader, hence resulting
in failed UL / DL transmission even though receivers are
rather sensitive (e.g., SINR = −20 dB). In addition, the success
probability difference for γ = 2.5 and γ = 3.5 is insignificant
when SINR is within large or small regions.
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Fig. 4. Transaction success probability P with different SINR
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the wireless blockchain net-
works for IoT systems based on RAFT, one of the most
commonly used private chain consensus mechanisms. The
security performance in terms of the transaction success rate
has been analyzed by mapping it with the UL and DL wireless
transmissions in the presence of a malicious jammer. Simula-
tion results have been conducted to verify the effectiveness of
derivations. Thus it provides a useful guide for the wireless
blockchain system design, deployment, and optimization.
As for future work, the multiple-jammer case can be con-
sidered as an extension to make the paper more generic and
practical. A predictive learning method is under development
to solve the multi-jammer problem. The critical challenge in
multi-jammer is the chaotic situation when the nodes’ position
in constant changing condition.
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